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Heredity and Heritability
A heritable trait is m ost simply an offspring's trait that resembles the parents' corresponding trait. Inheritance 
or heredity was a focus o f systematic research before its inclusion as a key concept within evolutionary
ill illtheory. An influential 18 and early 19 century theory o f heredity was preformationism. This view took 
several forms, each maintaining that organisms were passed on from one generation to the next, miniature 
and yet fully formed, and development was simply the growth o f the miniature organism. Subsequent 
accounts o f heredity included the theory that organisms inherited traits that their parents had developed
ththrough response to various environmental pressures. This view was widely held during the 19 century and 
usually attributed to Lamarck, A different concept o f heredity was crucial to Darwin's view that evolutionary 
change results from natural selection acting upon inherited traits under variation, Weismann's experimental 
refutation o f the inheritance o f acquired traits paved the way for the combination o f Darwin and Mendel's
thviews o f the nature o f heredity. The systematic study o f heredity in the 20 century focused on the gene as 
the unit o f heredity, (There is a vast amount o f helpful work on the history o f heredity including Fox-Keller 
(2002), Griesemer (1994), Morange (1998), Moss (2003), Sapp (2003), Sarkar (1998), Wade (1992), Winther 
(2000; 2001) and contributors to Buerton et al, (Eds.) (2000),) Two traditions now dominate the study of 
heredity: population genetics and molecular biology. The notion o f a quantitative measure o f the heritability 
o f any given trait comes from population genetics. The idea that what is inherited is a stock o f DNA, or the 
information contained in the DNA sequence, comes from molecular biology.
Philosophical discussions o f heredity have focused on the sustainability o f heritability analyses and more 
recently on the units o f heredity. Here 1 introduce the concept o f heritability and the problems associated with 
it. Next the units o f heredity discussion is introduced. Here 1 consider alternatives to the view that DNA is the 
most important hereditary material. The information view o f heredity is introduced and discussed and finally, 
several alternative or supplementary views o f heredity are introduced.
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1. Terminological issues
The term “heritable” applies to traits that are similar in parents and offspring. We inherit numerous attributes 
from our parents including their religious beliefs and, if we are lucky, their vast fortunes. The kinds of 
hereditary traits that biologists are interested in are those that are reliably transmitted from one generation to 
the next as a matter of biology. Darwin (1859/1968), working without the advantages that genetics would 
later bring, discussed hereditary traits at the level of phenotypes. Darwin demonstrated that natural selection 
sorts among hereditary variations, for example, the height of an organism, its weight, the color of its coat and 
so on. Most contemporary discussions of heredity constrain hereditary traits to those that can be 
demonstrated to be passed on genetically. The concept of “heritability” was introduced “to quantify the level 
of predictability of passage of a biologically interesting phenotype from parent to offspring” (Feldman, 151). 
Heritability is usually assessed by complex statistical analysis, careful experimentation or both.
Discussions of heredity invite confusions between mechanisms responsible for individual development and 
mechanisms responsible for the transmission of traits from one generation to the next. Genes are the standard 
units of inheritance discussed in biology. Genes are also taken to be the most important causal component in 
the development of an organism's traits. Methods derived from population genetics to assess heritability 
provide no information about the causal mechanisms contributing to the development of an individual's traits. 
Population geneticists study the patterns of transmission of traits in populations from one generation to the 
next. Molecular biologists identify coding sequences of DNA and hence the proteins that these sequence 
produce in the developing organism. Working together, molecular biologists and population geneticists can 
produce a convergent account of a particular gene, providing both its pattern of transmission and an account 
of its role in development. For example, medical geneticists may discover a pattern of inheritance for a 
disease in a family that leads them to hypothesize that there is a gene (or a number of genes) responsible for 
the development of the trait in individual humans. Molecular analysis may then lead to the discovery of a 
sequence of DNA that codes for an unusual protein that is in part responsible for the development of the 
symptoms of the disease.
2. Population genetics and the attempt to measure the heritability of 
traits
Mendelian genetics provides laws that govern the passing on of discrete traits from one generation to the 
next. For example, Mendel experimentally demonstrated particular patterns of inheritance for smooth and 
wrinkled peas in a population of pea plants. Discrete or discontinuous traits contrast with continuous or 
quantitative traits. Height in humans or leaf number in trees are continuous traits. Continuous traits vary on a 
continuum that can be represented as a normal distribution, graphed as a bell curve. Most interesting 
philosophical issues about heredity and heritability arise from the study of continuous traits.
The study of quantitative or continuous traits can be carried out by looking simply at phenotypes. For 
example, if a population of plants varies in height we can ask how much of this variation is due to genes. 
Assessing the proportion of the variation of a trait in a population that is due to genes is achieved by a 
statistical method called the analysis of variance. Once this analysis has been carried out a simple formula 
provides a number between 0 and 1 that is the heritability measure for the trait in question. I will use a few 
simple examples to illustrate the important concepts involved in producing heritability measures.
Before we consider the analysis of variance and its contribution to heritability measures, it is helpful to 
understand the general concept of heritability. Heritability is a measure of genetic influence. If a trait has 
high heritability, its varying from individual to individual in a population can be explained genetically. An 
imaginary example illustrates one way of assessing heritability. Say we have two students from a class and 
student a is 6'2" and student b is 4'2". To discover the influence of genes on height, we could clone both
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students and then swap the clones' environments and see what happens. In the figure below, the environments 
that a and b grew up in are Ea and Eb. Clones o f a and b are Ca and Cb.
Ea E b
1 Cb = 4'2" Ca = 6'2" Height is genetic
2 Cb = 5'8" Ca = 5'8" Height results from genes and environment
3 Cb = 6'2" Ca = 4'2" Height results entirely from environment
A scenario like 2 is the most likely outcome. O f course we can't clone humans (or faithfully replicate the 
environments they grow up in). We can do this with plants and other kinds o f experimental organisms and as 
a result we can get a good sense o f the contribution o f genes to variation in a phenotypic trait.
Heritability can be estimated in humans by comparing resemblance in the phenotypic traits o f twins. Twin 
studies make the following assumptions: Monozygotic, (identical), twins share all their genes and their 
environment but dizygotic, (fraternal), twins share half their genes and their environment. For any given trait, 
say height, we get the following results:
•  If  heritability is high and variation is due mostly to genes, then monozygotic twins will be closer in 
height than fraternal twins.
•  If  heritability is low and variation in height is due mostly to the environment, then monozygotic twins 
will be as different in height from one another as dyzygotic twins.
Finally, we can get a sense o f the heritability o f a trait by finding the slope o f the regression line on the plots 
o f offspring value for a trait graphed with parental value. If  the slope is 1, the trait is entirely genetic and if 
the slope is 0, then the trait is not genetic at all. I f  the variation among individuals is due to variation in their 
genes, then offspring ought to resemble their parents. Heritability is always a value between 1 and 0. In the 
graph below values for mid-parent height and mid-offspring height are plotted for a small sample population 
(mid-parent height is the average o f the height o f both parents). The slope o f the regression line is .75, which 
indicates high heritability. (It should be stressed that this is a very informal presentation o f this kind of 
estimation o f heritability and for this approach to provide any useful results important constraints on the 
nature o f the population and the relevant environment would have to be satisfied.)
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So far we have introduced methods o f measuring or calculating heritability that are somewhat intuitive. The 
problem with these methods is that they do not acknowledge all that is involved in the production o f variation 
in the quantitative traits o f organisms in a population. If we stick to the example o f variation in height in a 
sample population o f humans, we will discover that in most representative samples, heights are distributed 
more or less normally. The variance in height is defined as the average o f the squared difference between 
each measured height and the mean height for the population. Variance in phenotype or phenotypic variance 
is symbolized as Vp, (From here until the end o f this section 1 adopt a specific strategy for presenting the 
equations used in spelling out heritability relations, 1 start out (with equation 1) below) by presenting the 
simplest version o f the relevant equations. Simple equations such as 1) below are rarely ever satisfied but are 
routinely presented as adequate in elementary introductions to behavioral genetics. Subsequent equations in 
the sequence below render the relevant situation more accurately. Population geneticists endorse variants o f 
1") below and do not endorse 1),)
(1) Vp = v G + v E
Equation (1) simply says that the phenotypic variance is the variance due to genes plus the variance due to 
the organisms' environment. Behavioral geneticists and psychologists introduce heritability in the following 
way: Heritability is the proportion o f phenotypic variance that is attributable to genotypic variance: 
heritability = Vg /V p
This notion o f heritability is called broad sense heritability, hb , and is “the proportion o f phenotypic
differences due to all sources o f genetic variance” Plomin 1990, 234), Narrow sense heritability, h , is “the 




(3) h = VA/Vp
“Additive genetic variation (V a) is variation among individuals due to the additive effects o f genes” 
(Freeman & Heron, 206), For example, variation in height o f organisms could result from the contribution o f 
several alleles at a locus where each allele contributes more height to the organism. For example, allele A 
could contribute ,5 units to an organism's height, allele a another ,5 units and so on, A contrast with additive 
genetic variance is dominance variance (V q). In this case, say two alleles (A and a) are responsible for the 
organism's height. An organism with aa is 1,0 units high, an organism with A A is 2,0 units high but an
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organism with Aa  is also only 2.0 units high. Total genetic variance, Vg, is actually the sum of all the genetic 
variance. In the simplified case presented here this is
(4) VCi.VA + V|)
The implied equation for Vp from the discussion so far is:
O ') V p ..V A +  V |)  +  V h
But this equation still oversimplifies the situation and owes too much to Mendelianism. Variance in 
phenotype can result from gene interaction effects, or epistactic variance, Vi, This occurs when alleles at one 
locus have an effect on the phenotype that is dependent upon alleles at one or more other loci. Further, there 
may be a contribution to phenotypic variance from gene/environment interaction, V q x E- This occurs when 
the effect of the environment on the phenotype differs between genotypes. Finally, Vp can be effected by 
non-random correlations between genotypes and environments referred to as gene environment covariation, 
COV(G,E), For example, if plants with a genotype that tends to produce large plants also select nutrient rich 
environments and plants with a genotype that tends to produce small plants also select nutrient poor 
environments the variance in height would be increased. If the relation was switched the variance would 
decrease (Futuyma 1998). Factoring all the above in we now have the following:
(1") Vp = VA + Vd + Vi + VE + VG X E + COV(G,E) and 
(4') V g ..V A +  V |)  +  Vi
The assumption made by most evolutionary biologists is that Vi, Vg x  E and COV(G,E) are generally small 
and the most important component of variance from an evolutionary standpoint is Va - As a result,
2
evolutionary biologists are usually interested in h (= V a /V p ), In contrast, psychologists and behavioral
geneticists are more interested in hb (= V g /V p ), Psychologists are interested in the contribution of genes to 
human psychological traits whereas evolutionary biologists use heritability measures to predict and measure 
the response of a trait to selection. Philosophical discussion over measuring heritability has arisen mostly
from the use of hb measures in behavioral genetics and psychology. Much of this discussion takes off from a 
paper by Lewontin (1974) in which he argues that the analysis of variance cannot provide us with answers to 
questions about how much genes contribute to variance in a given trait.
3. Philosophical issues arising from heritability analysis
Discussions of the viability of heritability measures were most heated in the 1970’s and 1980's, In the 1970's 
discussions about IQ and race came to a head (this issue was revisited in the 1990's with the publication of 
Hermstein and Murray (1999)) and in the late 1970's and early 1980's sociobiology came under critical 
scrutiny. Both proponents of the hereditary nature of IQ and sociobiologists made a connection between 
human behavioral traits and genes. Hereditarians in the IQ debates explicitly relied upon heritability analyses 
such as those introduced above. Critics of sociobiology and hereditarianism over IQ included biologists, 
philosophers and many social scientists as well as many left leaning political and social activists (See Gould 
(1981), Paul (1998) and Segerstrale (2000) for some of the relevant history here).
The point of departure for many philosophers criticizing heritability analysis is Lewontin's (1974) paper on 
the analysis of variance. (It is worth noting that Lewontin's paper is somewhat informal and should perhaps 
be best viewed as Lewontin's attempt to pass on the received wisdom among population geneticists at the 
time to a wider audience. The formal arguments Lewontin alludes to are presented in a number of places 
including Layzer (1974) (and later Kempthome (1978)) and precursors to these arguments can be found in
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Hogben (1933) and can also be found in R.A. Fishers work.) Lewontin claimed that equation 1") above 
presented the most accurate picture of the contributions to phenotypic variance. He went on to argue that Vi, 
Vq x e  and COV (G,E) were not negligible. In fact, he argues that these are always part and parcel of the 
variance in traits. As a result, apportioning the phenotypic variance between genes and environment is no 
easy matter and standard analyses of variance simply cannot come up with useful and informative values for
2 2hb and h . Lewontin also pointed out that many proponents of heritability measures mistakenly attribute the 
heritability values to individuals rather than populations. Finally, he argued that norms of reaction gave a 
more accurate picture of the relations between genes, environment and phenotypic traits. A norm of reaction 
is a graph of a quantitative phenotype plotted as a function of environment for different genotypes. Many 
philosophers and biologists have extended and refined Lewontin's criticism of the analysis of variance (e.g., 
Block 1995, Kitcher 1985, Sarkar 1998, Sober 1988) and most have shared his conclusions that heritability 
measures are hard to come by and that norms of reaction are a superior way to examine gene environment 
interactions.
One response to these kinds of criticisms is to emphasize caution in the use of heritability measures and to 
re-emphasize Lewontin's point that such measures do not provide information about the traits of individuals 
(See e.g., Plomin et al. 1990; 1997, Hamer & Copeland 1998). Kitcher (1985) pointed out in response to this 
line of defense that words of caution do not seem to be enough and many behavioral geneticists and 
psychologists still talk as if they can discover the genetic components of human behavioral traits by using 
heritability analyses. A second line of response is to argue that norms of reaction are almost impossible to 
generate for complex human traits and as a result, are not a serious contender in the business of ascertaining 
the genetic causes of human traits. Lewontin himself introduced this problem for norms of reaction. In 
organisms whose genotypes and environments can be exhaustively manipulated a norm of reaction for a 
particular trait can be produced. Lewontin cites early work on Drosophila larvae's responses to temperature 
as pioneering work of this kind. The problem for most human traits, particularly human behavioral traits, is 
that we have no clear sense of either what the relevant genes to examine are or what the range of relevant 
environments is. This response need not necessarily blunt Lewontin's critical attack on heritability measures, 
as in cases were a norm of reaction can be reliably produced, we do have more information about the 
relations between genes and environment than can be provided by a standard analysis of variance. Further, 
attempts to experimentally partition the contribution of genetic variance to phenotypic variance run into 
problems for human traits similar to the problems presented by attempts to generate norms of reaction. The 
examples in Section 2. above are artificial for a reason: it is hard to establish the relevant genotypes and 
environments that lead to variance in human traits. The current consensus among philosophers of biology is 
that heritability analyses are misleading about the genetic causes of human traits. New work on norms of 
reaction (see e.g., Pigliucci 2001) reinforces Lewontin's point about the information that can be gained from 
such analyses.
4. Molecular biology, DNA and the inheritance of information
Evolutionary biologists attempt to account for the process of evolutionary change, including speciation and 
changes to organisms through time within a species. There was much progress in conceptualizing 
evolutionary change when it was characterized in terms of changing gene frequencies in the 1930's and 
1940's. Many evolutionary biologists discuss evolution entirely from a genetic perspective. After genes were 
established as the relevant heritable material the next step was to conceptualize the relevant heritable material 
in terms of molecular structure. In 1953 the structure of DN A was discovered and with this discovery came a 
mechanism for accounting for the duplication of heritable material and its transmission from one generation 
to the next. Richard Dawkins (1976; 1981; 1985) refers to DNA molecules as replicators, they are capable of 
faithful self replication. Heredity can be understood on this view as the successful reproduction of replicators 
across generations.
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Understanding more about the nature of DNA and RNA reveals a role that a concept of information can 
contribute to this notion of heredity. The bases in DNA and RNA can be helpfully construed as letters in an 
alphabet and the relation between the triplets of letters in the RNA and the resulting polypeptide chain can be 
construed as a coding relation. So, the DNA contains the code for the polypeptide. Rather than causing the 
production of the relevant protein, the DNA sequence contains the information that codes for it.
The replicator based notion of heredity can now be refined. Rather than the heritable material consisting of 
discrete strands of DNA passed on from one generation to the next, heredity can be characterized in terms of 
information. What is relevantly passed on from one generation to the next is the information in the DNA, 
encoded in the unique sequence of bases. The information gene concept is pervasive in the work of 
theoretical evolutionary biologists. Perhaps the most influential formulation of the concept of heredity in 
terms of information was that of the evolutionary theorist George Williams. For example, he says: “In 
evolutionary theory, a gene could be defined as any hereditary information for which there is a favorable or 
unfavorable selection bias equal to several or many times the rate of endogenous change” (Williams 1966, 
25). And later: “A gene is not a DNA molecule; it is the transcribable information coded by the 
moleeule"(Williams 1992, 11).
The idea that heredity is best understood as the passing on of information via DNA is expanded and defended 
by both biologists and philosophers including Dawkins (1976; 1981; 1985), Maynard Smith (1998; 2000a; 
2000b) and Dennett (1995). The idea has also been subject to a large amount of critical scrutiny and 
alternatives to the genetic information view of heredity have been proposed and defended.
5. Alternative views of the units of heredity
We gain a sense of the dynamic of the debate over the units of heredity by considering a debate between 
Dawkins and one of his critics. Dawkins contrasted his replicators with vehicles, the organisms (or cells) that 
carry around the hereditary material. (Many philosophers of biology now refer to the replicator/vehicle 
distinction as the replicator/interactor distinction, a refinement of Dawkins' distinction due to Hull (1981).) 
With this distinction, issues of heredity relevant for evolution are deemed to be cleanly separated from issues 
of development that involve the unfolding of the information carried in the replicator molecules. Dawkins 
(1981) elaborates his position in response to a challenge by Bateson (1978). Bateson asks why a bird can't be 
a nest's way of making another nest, manipulating Dawkins' claim that a bird is a gene's way of making 
another gene. Dawkins responds that there is a “causal arrow going from gene to bird, but none in the 
opposite direction” (1981, 98). He goes on to defend the special status of genetic factors as factors that 
“replicate themselves, blemishes and all” (1981). Dawkins thinks that challenges such as Bateson's are rooted 
in several mistaken assumptions. First, Dawkins worries that a Lamarckian view about the inheritance of 
acquired traits is behind such objections and hence that Weismann's view that heritable materials are only in 
the germ-line is under threat. Second, Dawkins thinks that challenges such as Bateson's rest on a mistaken 
conflation of development and evolution. These themes are later reflected in Maynard Smith's (1998) 
suggestions for a combined evolutionary developmental biology that preserves a clear distinction between 
heritable (information bearing) material and the resources required for that information to be expressed in 
development.
Despite Dawkins' apparent easy rebuttal of Bateson's criticisms, many challenge the replicator view of 
inheritance, including proponents of developmental systems theory such as Oyama, Gray and Griffiths (Gray 
1992; Griffiths & Gray 1994; Oyama 2000 and contributors to Oyama et al. 2002). Also, even philosophers 
who are opposed to the developmental systems approach now favor a multiple units of inheritance view (e.g., 
Sterelny et al. 1996). These challenges are grounded in a wide range of empirical work in many areas of 
biology and theoretical work on the role that the concept of information plays in understanding heredity. We 
first look at the kind of empirical data that supports a challenge to the replicator only view of heredity.
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Type of Inheritance
Epigenetic Factors (Jablonka and Lamb 1995)
Cytoplasmic Factors
Chemical traces from  parental foraging
Gut micro-organisms
Social traditions:
•  Feeding methods
•  Migration routes and schooling sites
•  Home ranges and territories
•  Reproductive sites
•  Dominance rank
•  Song
Other features o f  the environment:
• e.g., geographic range
Table 1. (Adapted from Gray 1992, 180 and amended.)
The idea that cellular materials, Gray's “cytoplasmic factors,” are inherited is straightforward to support 
empirically. In sexually reproducing organisms almost all o f the cellular material in the zygote is inherited 
from the mother. This material includes all manner o f organelles, enzymes and other essential materials that 
contribute to the subsequent division o f the zygote to produce the cells o f the mature organism (Many have 
pointed this out including Fox Keller 2000, Gray 2001, Griesemer 1994, Moss 2003 and Sterelny & Griffiths
1999). W hat Sterelny et al. (1996) call the “developmental matrix” can be much more inclusive than just 
these cellular materials. The developmental matrix includes all factors the contribute to the phenotype o f the 
mature organism and many o f these factors are inherited separately from the information contained in the 
germ-line DNA. The widest conception o f the developmental matrix includes the organism's environment, 
parts o f which have been shaped by previous generations o f the organism (burrows and dams are obvious 
examples o f organism structured environments) (Oddling Smee, Laland and Feldman 2003). Developmental 
systems theorists take these empirical findings about multiple inheritance systems to support their view that 
genes play no privileged role in evolution and development. Rather, “the developmental system as a whole is 
the only replicator” and “the full range o f developmental resources is the complex system replicated in 
development” (Sterelny et al. 1996. See also Gray 1992 and Griffiths & Gray 1994). Critics o f developmental 
systems theory have rejected their proposals as hopelessly holistic. Such responses are usually accompanied 
by the insistence that something must set genes apart as distinct and important units o f inheritance. Much of 
this discussion has focused on the gene as carrier o f information.
The informational definition o f the gene is that genes contain information that is passed on from one 
generation to the next and that information codes for a particular protein or polypeptide. (More encompassing 
information gene concepts maintain that the gene codes for phenotypes more broadly construed.) As Sterelny 
and Griffiths put it: “The classical molecular gene concept is a stretch o f DNA that codes for a single 
polypeptide chain” (1999, 132). Genes, on this view, contain information about the phenotype, the protein
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that is expressed. While most biologists believe that genes contain information about the relevant phenotype, 
none believe that the information in the genes is sufficient to produce the relevant phenotypes. The standard 
view is that genes contain the relevant or important information guiding the development of the organism. All 
other cellular machinery merely assists in the expression of the information. One way to put this idea is that 
genes introduce information to the developmental process while all other mechanisms make merely a causal 
contribution to development.
There are several alternative analyses of information that could be applied to genetic information and one 
comes from information theory. Information theory holds that “an event carries information about another 
event to the extent that it is causally related to it in a systematic fashion. Information is thus said to be 
conveyed over a “channel” connecting the “sender” [or signal] with the “receiver” when a change in the 
receiver is causally related to a change in the “sender” (Gray 2001, 190), On this view information is reduced 
to causal covariance or systematic causal dependence. Philosophers of biology refer to this characterization 
of genetic information as the “causal” view, Sterelny and Griffiths (1999) illustrate how the causal 
information concept could work in the context of molecular biology: “The idea of information as systematic 
causal dependence can be used to explain how genes convey developmental information. The genome is the 
signal and the rest of the developmental matrix provides channel conditions under which the life cycle of the 
organism contains (receives) information about the genome” (Sterelny & Griffiths 1999, 102),
Several have argued that the causal view suffers from serious problems. The arguments owe much to 
Bateson's argument against Dawkins and bear a structural resemblance to that argument, Sterelny and 
Griffiths (1999) point out that “it is a fundamental fact of information theory that the role of signal source 
and channel condition can be reversed” (102) as the signal/channel distinction is simply a matter of causal 
covariance. Further, the signal/channel distinction is a function of observers' interests. For example, we could 
choose to hold the developmental history of an organism constant and from this perspective the organism's 
phenotype would carry information about their genotype. But if we choose to “hold all developmental factors 
other than (say) nutrient quantity constant, the amount of nutrition available to the organism will covary with, 
and hence also carry information about its phenotype” (p. 102), The causal information concept is lacking, 
because it cannot distinguish the genes as the singular bearers of important or relevant information. Rather, 
on this view, genes are just one source of information; aspects of the organism's environment and cellular 
material also contain information. This position is called the “parity thesis” (Griffiths & Gray 1994), The 
parity thesis exposes the need for another information concept that elevates genes alone to the status of 
information bearers.
Alternative concepts of information have been examined in attempts to respond to this situation; one is 
referred to variously as intentional, semantic or teleosemantic information (the term “teleosemantic” is used 
in what follows). This notion of information has been defended most forcefully recently by Maynard Smith 
(1998; 2000a; 2000b) but versions of it are defended by philosophers including Dennett (1995) and Sterelny 
(1996; 2000), The term “teleosemantics” is borrowed from the philosophical program of reducing meaning to 
biological function (teleology) and then reducing biological function to natural selection (cf, Sterelny & 
Griffiths 1999).
Applying this view to the current problem results in the following: “a gene contains information about the 
developmental outcomes that it was selected to produce” (Sterelny & Griffiths 1999, 105). Maynard Smith 
puts the view as follows: "DNA contains information that has been programmed by natural selection" 
(Maynard Smith 2000a, 190). The gene contains information not just as a result of relevantly causally 
co-varying with the phenotype, but as a result of having the function of producing the relevant phenotype. 
Defenders of this view, claim that this allows for the information to stay the same even if the channel 
conditions change; if the channel conditions change, the information in the gene has simply been 
misinterpreted. This concept could solve the problem of rendering the genes the sole information bearers, as 
“if other developmental causes do not contain [teleosemantic] information and genes do, then genes do 
indeed play a unique role in development” (Sterelny and Griffiths 1999, 104).
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Although the teleosemantie view shows promise, the debate has not ended here. The teleosemantie view 
opens up a possibility: if a developmental cause, part of the cellular machinery for example, is found to be 
heritable and performs the function of producing a particular developmental outcome, then by definition, it 
also contains teleosemantie information. Many, including Fox Keller (2000), Gray (1992), Griesemer (1994), 
Griffiths and Gray (1994), Jablonka (2002), Jablonka and Lamb (1995), Moss (2003) and Sarkar (1996;
2000) have argued that indeed there are such mechanisms. These authors draw various conclusions from the 
demonstrated presence of mechanisms that are not genes, are heritable and perform the function of producing 
a specific developmental outcome. Developmental systems theorists such as Griffiths and Gray take these 
findings to show that teleosemantie information succumbs to the parity thesis also. They go on to argue that 
no concept of information will distinguish genes as a special contributor to development. Genes are just 
fellow travelers alongside cellular machinery and the environment in shaping developmental outcomes. 
Others such as Fox Keller (2000), Jablonka (2002) and Sarkar (1996; 2000) are more cautious and hold out 
for a concept of information that renders genes a distinct kind of information bearer. For example, Jablonka 
(2002) presents alternative systems of inheritance, such as those presented in the table above, entirely in 
informational terms. She starts from the position that inheritance is information transfer but then argues that 
there are distinct forms of information passed on in the different inheritance systems. Genetic information is 
distinct from epigenetic information and both are distinct from the information passed on by social learning.
6. Prospects and recommendations for further reading
There is something of a consensus in most fields (e.g., philosophy of biology, evolutionary biology, 
psychology and behavioral genetics) that heritability measures (particularly hb measures) only have a very 
limited use. The consensus among philosophers of biology is that broad heritability measures are 
uninformative but there are a few dissenting voices (e.g Sesardic 1993). Kaplan (2000) provides an 
introduction to heritability and its use in behavioral genetics. Sarkar (1998) presents a sophisticated (and 
technically quite difficult) treatment of arguments against heritability. Freeman and Heron (1998) present a 
clear analysis of the problems with the use of heritability measures by proponents of the connection between 
IQ and race (understanding this analysis requires some knowledge of statistics). Block (1995) presents an 
overview of arguments against the use of heritability measures in the IQ and race literature. This overview is 
helpful and specifically designed for a non-technical audience. Sober (1988) presents a defense of Lewontin's
(1974) landmark criticism of the use of the analysis of variance in assessing heritability. (Sober's paper is 
difficult and a worthy project would be to revisit the paper with a view to assessing the consistency of Sober's 
conclusions with Lewontin's.)
Sterelny and Griffiths (1999) contains a useful introduction to many of the issues about units of inheritance 
and the concept of genetic information. The units of heredity debate is currently in full swing. A recent issue 
of Philosophy o f  Science (67, No. 2, 2000) includes Maynard Smith's defense of his view of genetic 
information with responses by Sterelny, Godfrey-Smith and Sarkar. Most recently, Sarkar presents a defense 
of a modest informational gene concept and Godfrey-Smith counters with a more skeptical line about genetic 
information in an exchange in Hitchcock (2004). Oyama, Griffiths and Gray (2001) contains several essays 
attacking both Dawkin's replicator view and defending various alternative theories of inheritance. Niche 
construction is clearly laid out and defended at length in Odling-Smee, Laland and Feldman (2003). Initial 
reviews indicate that West-Eberhard (2003) may reignite debates over the plausibility Lamarckian 
inheritance. Debates about the units of inheritance shape discussion in the emerging field of evolutionary 
developmental biology and this emerging field presents many opportunities for philosophers to contribute to 
an ongoing discussion in biology (see e.g., contributors to Biology and Philosophy 18, No. 2).
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